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"Doing Business" in Montreal: The Effects
of the Addition of "Fifth Forum"
Jurisdiction under the Montreal Convention
Gregory C. Walker*
Introduction
The 1999 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air' [hereinafter Montreal Convention] went
into effect on November 4, 2003. It completely replaces the 1929
Convention of the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air2 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention] and its
subsequent amendments.3 The Montreal Convention's ratification serves
as a much-needed and long-awaited response to the tremendous changes
in international air travel since 1929, and its adoption reflects substantial
progress in bringing the liability of carriers in line with today's aviation
industry.4
A significant effect of the Montreal Convention lies in its extension
of jurisdiction to plaintiffs who sustain injury during international travel
by air, enabling them to file suit in their home state provided that the
carrier operates service for international carriage by air either to or from
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Professor Ronald A. Brand, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International
Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, for his invaluable guidance,
insightful comments, and incredible patience in the preparation of this paper. The
research for this paper was made possible through funding by the U.S. Department of
Education and the University of Pittsburgh's Center for West European Studies' Foreign
Language & Area Studies Fellowship.
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by
Air, May 28, 1999 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Montreal Convention],
available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.unification. conventionmontreal. 1999/.
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. I I [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3. See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at art. 55.
4. See generally Gillian Flener, Comments, The Effects of the Amendments to the
Baggage Check Provisions of the Warsaw Convention-Clearing the Way For More
Effective Check-in Procedures, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 295 (2001).
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the plaintiffs home state. Furthermore, the Convention supports
jurisdiction regardless of whether the cause of action stems from the
carrier's activities in that state. In this regard, the treaty's provision on
jurisdiction bears a striking resemblance to what United States courts
recognize as general "doing business" jurisdiction-the same form of
general jurisdiction that has prompted substantial debate and
significantly frustrated the efforts of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law to draft a global treaty on international jurisdiction and
foreign judgments.5 The adoption of this jurisdictional principle under
the Montreal Convention and concurrent scrutiny of this doctrine at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law suggests an
inconsistency in the international community's position on "doing
business" jurisdiction, and it is that discrepancy that provides the
inspiration for this paper.
In recognition of the voluminous literature charting the genesis of
general jurisdiction in the United States,6 this commentary commences
with a brief, if not cursory, review of the development of "doing
business" jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court and the criticism it has
prompted. Part II highlights two cases from outside the United States
that display similar approaches to general jurisdiction and illustrate that
the adoption of a "doing business" type of jurisdiction is not unique to
the United States. Part III opens with a discussion of the 1929 Warsaw
Convention, primarily discussing its purpose and the jurisdictional
principles established under the treaty. Additionally, the third section
considers the factors that prompted the drafting and subsequent adoption
of the Montreal Convention in 1999 and concludes with an examination
of its fora for jurisdiction under Article 33-principally its "fifth forum"
rule of general jurisdiction.
Part IV builds on the previous three by comparing the boundaries of
5. Report on the Work of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project, In
Particular on the Preliminary Text Achieved at its Third Meeting-25-28 March 2003,
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No. 22 (June 2003)
[hereinafter Preliminary Draft Convention]. A copy of the Preliminary Draft Convention
is available on The Hague Conference website at http://www.hcch.net/
e/workprog/jdgm.html.
6. See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV.
610 (1988); Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (examining recent cases on general jurisdiction
and proposing specific restrictions when foreign defendants are involved); Patrick J.
Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119 (regarding
necessity of general jurisdiction to fill the gaps created by limited constitutional use of
specific jurisdiction); Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction,
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (looking at origin and scope of general "doing business"
jurisdiction). These articles provide an ample starting point from which to begin an
investigation into the concept of general jurisdiction.
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the United States' "doing business" jurisdiction with those of the "fifth
forum" jurisdiction under the Montreal Convention. Finally, Part V
considers the adoption of the Montreal Convention as evidence of
gradually growing acceptance of "doing business" jurisdiction in the
international community as well as its implications for a global
understanding of jurisdiction in light of the efforts of the Special
Commission of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to
draft a global treaty on jurisdiction.
1. The Development of "Doing Business" Jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court
Until well into the nineteenth century, U.S. courts maintained that a
corporation had "no legal existence outside of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it [was] created.",7  Yet as corporations and
commerce continued to expand beyond state borders, courts were forced
to reconsider the territorial concepts of jurisdiction laid down in
Pennoyer v. Neff.8 In doing so, they slowly abandoned theories based on
"consent" and "implied consent" in favor of a "presence" theory
premised on the notion that "[a] foreign corporation is amenable to
process... if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to
such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there." 9 This
transition heralded today's well-established tradition of determining
"presence," for jurisdictional purposes, by assessing a defendant's
contacts with, and activities in, a given forum.
In 1945, the Supreme Court seized its opportunity to develop such
an analysis in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
10
Borrowing the "minimum contacts" language from Milliken v. Meyer,"l
the Court focused on the significance of establishing a nexus between the
defendant's activities and the forum state and elaborated that such
contacts must be "systematic and continuous" to satisfy jurisdiction. 2
However, the Court also noted the possibility that "single or isolated"
contacts may suffice for jurisdiction provided the cause of action
stemmed from the defendant's contacts in the forum.13 Yet in stressing
the importance of both the nature and number of contacts without
7. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839).
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917). Also
cited in JOHN C. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & JOHN E. SEXTON,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (West Group 2001) (1968).
10. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940).
12. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, 320.
13. Id. at 317, 318.
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providing concrete guidelines, International Shoe left considerable room
for lower courts, as well as later Supreme Courts, to interpret what
constituted sufficient "business" by a defendant to justify jurisdiction.
If the International Shoe opinion succeeded in aligning the United
States with the then prevailing principles of jurisdictional jurisprudence
abroad, 14 the Court made a rather abrupt retreat from those standards
several years later in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.' 5 In
Perkins, the Court was asked to determine whether a Philippine
corporation, whose operations were halted during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippine islands during World War II and whose
president managed the business from his home in Ohio during those
years, could be forced to defend in Ohio state courts against a
nonresident of Ohio where the cause of action arose from "activities
entirely distinct" from its activities in Ohio.16 Noting that Benguet's
president "carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of
the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company,"' 7 the Court
concluded that the defendant's conduct in the forum was sufficiently
substantial to permit jurisdiction. In other words, the Court
acknowledged in Perkins that doing business in the forum state, and that
alone, can constitute enough of a presence to permit jurisdiction.
Although no other cases involving general jurisdiction would come
before the Supreme Court until Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,
S.A. v. Hall, 8 decided in 1984, the Supreme Court did hear several
specific jurisdiction cases during the 1980s that provide relevant and
instructive language. Writing for the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 19 Justice White weighed the "minimum contacts" test
established in International Shoe against the reasonableness and fairness
of the burden cast upon the defendant and found the requisite support for
jurisdiction to be lacking. 0 He described the "foreseeability" element of
due process analysis as one that is "not the mere likelihood that a product
14. Juenger, Friedrich K., American Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect,
65 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 9 (1993).
15. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
16. Id. at 446-47.
17. Id. at 448. The case reveals that Benguet's president maintained an office in
Ohio from which he conducted business on behalf of the company. Furthermore,
defendant's files and employee records were located in the forum. He carried on
correspondence, drew and distributed paychecks, and maintained two active bank
accounts carrying substantial balances with company funds. These were the more
significant connections the Court found to exist between the defendant and the forum
state.
18. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
19. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
20. Id. at 292.
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will find its way into the forum State.",21 Rather, it is one in which "the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. 22 Holding
foreseeability to be a distinguishing factor between products which find
their way into the forum via commerce and those which make their way
there via the consumer, Justice White carved out of Gray's23 "course of
commerce" language a metaphorical "stream of commerce" to support
his conclusion that there was a lack of purposeful availment.24
The Court was later split on its interpretations of this "stream of
commerce" language in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.25 In
Asahi, Justice O'Connor wrote for a plurality which agreed that simply
placing a product into the "stream of commerce," as opposed to actually
directing it towards the forum, was not enough to constitute availing
oneself to a lawsuit.26 And though one might contend that Asahi's
27peculiar facts qualify its relevance, it is important to note how the Court
fractured on whether there is a predictable current to the "stream of
commerce" that justifies the reasonable "foreseeability" of a suit.
When the Court analyzed due process in Helicopteros, it finally
28 tadistinguished general jurisdiction from specific jurisdiction, noting that
the latter required a direct connection between the cause of action and the
defendant's activities. 29 Despite the defendant's various activities in the
forum in Helicopteros-negotiations, the purchase of helicopters,
training for defendant's pilots, and acceptance of payments in bank
accounts-the aggregate of these contacts proved insufficient to establish
general jurisdiction.30 Justice Blackmun, by means of differentiating
21. Id. at 297.
22. Id.
23. Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il.2d 432 (Ill. 1961).
24. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 298.
25. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
26. Id. at lll-12.
27. Stephen B. Burbank, Practice And Procedure: The World in Our Courts, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1468 (1999). "The holding in Asahi, where the Court denied
California's power to adjudicate an indemnity claim by a defendant against one of its
component part manufacturers, will probably have limited significance because of its
unusual facts, in particular the facts that the party invoking the court's jurisdiction was a
Taiwanese corporation, that the claim involved was probably governed by foreign law,
and that the putative party resisting jurisdiction was also a foreign corporation."
28. See Arthur von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L, REV. 1121, 1144-64 (1966) for the origins of this
distinction.
29. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 S. CT. REV. 77, 80-81; see also Von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 28, at 1136-1144.
30. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19
(1984).
2004)
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Helicopteros from Perkins, provided a litany of precedential contacts that
were not present in the case:
Helicol never has been authorized to do business in Texas and
never has had an agent for the service of process within the State. It
never has performed helicopter operations in Texas or sold any
product that reached Texas, never solicited business in Texas, never
signed any contract in Texas, never had any employee based there,
and never recruited an employee in Texas. In addition, Helicol never
has owned real or personal property in Texas and never has
maintained an office or establishment there. Helicol has maintained
no record in Texas and has no shareholders in the State.
31
Though the Court ultimately failed to delineate a clear threshold for the
level of activity required to support general jurisdiction, the Justices did
not alter the "continuous and systematic" level of business activities that
satisfied the Court in Perkins. In the end, the Court maintained that
general jurisdiction exacts a higher level of activity than specific
jurisdiction, where the presence of a direct connection between the
defendant's contacts and the cause of action effectively lowers the bar of
activity required to justify jurisdiction.32
The lack of a clear and concrete threshold of activity for the
assertion of "doing business" jurisdiction has caused some confusion in
the lower courts 33 and resulted in inconsistent applications of what
constitutes "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" activity. 34 Not
surprisingly, this inconsistency has prompted significant criticism from
legal scholars.35 Though much of the lower courts' lack of uniformity in
interpreting and assessing sufficiency may be attributed to the Supreme
Court's failure to delineate clearly the boundaries of the general
jurisdiction doctrine, some of the criticism focuses on the wisdom of the
31. Id. at411.
32. Despite Helicopteros' shortcoming in not providing a clear threshold for activity,
the case stands for two important principles-that the "doing business" jurisdiction in
Perkins is alive and well and that general jurisdiction serves to limit rather than broaden
courts' jurisdictional reach. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a
Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. PiTT. L. REv. 661, 689 (1999).
33. See Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 633-36.
34. See, e.g., Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 694 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying
Mississippi law); Catalana v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 18, 22 (D. Md.
1984), affd, 806 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1986).
35. See Linda Silberman, Symposium: Export/Import: American Civil Justice in a
Global Context: Eighth Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy,
Article: Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 319 (2002) (suggesting
modifications to Article 18 that might resolve the impasse on "doing business"
jurisdiction). See also Twitchell, supra note 6; Borchers, supra note 6; Juenger, supra
note 6.
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doctrine itself. In fact, the spectrum of scholarship extends from those
who merely question the appropriateness of holding systematic and
continuous activity of foreign defendants sufficient to constitute
jurisdiction 36 to those who advocate the complete elimination of general
"doing business" jurisdiction altogether.37 Those who fall in the middle
often assert general, albeit qualified, support for the basic premise of
general jurisdiction but propose restrictions like limiting the exercise of
such jurisdiction to the home state38 or modifications such as a broader
test for specific jurisdiction that would mitigate the need to employ
general jurisdiction.39
Commentary from the Special Commission of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law provides a broader and more
global perspective on the matter. In a 2000 Report of the Special
Commission, better known as the Nygh-Pocar Report, the salient
criticism emerging out of the international dialogue on general "doing
business" jurisdiction was the "uncertainty" that courts would face in the
interpretation and application of the doctrine, namely "determining the
quality and quantity of activity which is needed in order to establish
jurisdiction. 'Ao The Commission's comments reveal a collective
apprehension to the assertion of jurisdiction based solely on a
defendant's regular activity in the forum and without regard to the
existence of other, less attenuated links when the dispute is unrelated to a
defendant's course of conduct in the state. An interesting irony emerges
in this argument when viewed in the context of the Montreal Convention.
However, before embarking on an examination of the Montreal
Convention and its provisions on jurisdiction, it is instructive to look at
36. See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 33.
37. See, e.g., Harold G. Maier and Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for
Judicial Jurisdiction of Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 271-280 (1991)
(proposing that jurisdiction premised on general jurisdiction, and that alone, actually
violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution).
38. See Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 28, at 1141-44.
39. See Twitchell, supra note 33 (arguing that such a test would make general
jurisdiction dispensable while cautioning against its abolishment).
40. See Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, Report of the Special Commission on
International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(2000) [hereinafter Report of the Special Commission], available at
www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. It is worth noting that the express criticism of the
Nygh-Pocar Report aligns itself closely, if not exactly, with the criticism of American
scholars regarding the lower courts' treatment of "doing business" jurisdiction. The
authors, writing on behalf of the Special Commission, justify the exclusion of the
doctrine from the Convention's Preliminary Draft Convention by highlighting the
constituents' aversion to the "risk of encouraging a dispute between the parties at the
stage when the jurisdiction of the court seised is being determined." Id. Such a concern,
however, seems wholly unfounded because it is left to the court to decide whether
jurisdiction exists.
2004]
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two cases that illustrate variations on "doing business" jurisdiction
outside of the United States.
II. "Doing Business" Approaches Beyond the United States
Notwithstanding the fact that a defendant corporation may be
incorporated and maintain its principal place of business outside of the
United States, it is clear from Perkins that courts of the United States can
assert jurisdiction if the corporate entity has established a presence in the
forum State by conducting business of a "systematic and continuous"
nature. This jurisdictional concept is not, however, unique to United
States jurisprudence.4'
In the case of Goto v. Malaysian Airline System, 42 the widow of a
Japanese businessman filed suit in Japan against Malaysian Airlines after
the plane on which her husband was traveling crashed in the vicinity of
Johore Bahrn, Malaysia.43 In December 1977, Tomio Goto booked a
ticket in Kuala Lumpur for round-trip domestic passage to Penang on
Malaysian Airlines.44 The return flight to Kuala Lumpur crashed, killing
all of the passengers on board.45 On the question of whether the
defendant airline was subject to jurisdiction in Japan, the Supreme Court
of Japan ruled:
... [I]f a defendant is a foreign corporation with a main office
abroad, it is ordinarily beyond the adjudicatory jurisdiction of Japan,
unless it is willing to subject itself to Japanese jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, as an exception, a defendant can be subjected to the
adjudicatory jurisdiction of Japan, whatever its nationality may be or
wherever it may be located, if the case relates to Japan or if the
defendant has some legal nexus with Japan.... The appellant
[Malaysian Airlines] has appointed Gyokusho Cho as its
representative in Japan and has established a place of business in
Tokyo. On these premises, the appellant shall be reasonably
subjected to the jurisdiction of Japan, even though it is a foreign
corporation that has its head office abroad.
46
Despite the carrier's argument that the ticket purchased in Kuala Lumpur
41. See Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws Course:
Adding a Comparative Dimension, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNATN'L L. 389, 404 (1995).
42. Goto v. Malaysian Airline Sys., 35 Minsh_ (No. 7) 1224 (Sup. Ct., October 16,
1981); 26 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 122 (1983) (reprinted) (Copy of case on file with author).
43. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS 48-49 (Clarendon Press 1996). The widow and heir of Mr. Goto
brought suit against Malaysian Airlines for damages arising from non-performance of the
contract of carriage.
44. See Goto, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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for domestic travel in Malaysia had nothing to do with the Tokyo office
or the airline's operations in Japan, the Court sustained jurisdiction based
on the airline's maintenance of a branch office in Tokyo.47 There is little
doubt, as one scholar has suggested, that the facts of Goto would be
sufficient for American "doing business" general jurisdiction. s Indeed,
one must simply consider the business in which airline carriers engage-
the regular operation of flights to and from the destinations they serve.
Such conduct would very likely be viewed as commensurate with the
continuous and systematic activity found to satisfy general jurisdiction in
Perkins.
Additionally, if Mr. Goto and his family had lived in the United
Kingdom at the time of the accident and Malaysian Airlines maintained a
branch office and operated flights from London, his widow could have
secured jurisdiction there. In England, no connection must exist between
the cause of action and the foreign defendant's activities within the
forum, so long as the defendant is considered to be "present" in the
country. 49 In South India Shipping Corp. Ltd. v. Export-Import Bank of
Korea,50 the defendant bank, based in Korea, was deemed to be "present"
and have an "established place of business" in England.51 Despite the
defendant's contention that notice was improperly served and
consequently invalid, the bank was forced to defend in English courts
even though it merely conducted "external relations with other banks"
and "carried out preliminary work in relation to granting or obtaining
loans. 52 The court summarized Bank of Korea's contacts and activities
in its opinion as follows:
The defendant bank is an import-export bank, not a high street bank.
It has both premises and staff within the Jurisdiction. It conducts
external relations with other banks and financial institutions. It
47. Id.
48. See LOWENFELD, supra note 43, at 49. If the passenger lived in New York and
Malaysian Airlines maintained an office branch that conducted "continuous and
systematic" business similar to that in Perkins, she would very likely secure jurisdiction
in the New York state courts. This is the identical situation cited in the hypothetical
earlier in the text.
49. See DICEY AND MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (13th ed., 2000), at 297-298.
50. S. India Shipping Corp Ltd. v. Export-Import Bank of Korea [1985] 1 W.L.R.
585 (C.A.) (Copy on file with author).
51. "The plaintiff's claim is, in round figures, for U.S. $13 million together with
interest alleged to be due and owing to the plaintiffs under two letters of guarantee
whereby, in consideration of the plaintiffs entering into certain shipbuilding contracts, the
defendants irrevocably guaranteed to the plaintiffs the repayment to them of certain
advance payments made by them to a company incorporated in Korea and in connection
with certain shipbuilding contracts entered into between that company and the plaintiffs,
a corporation incorporated under the laws of India." Id. at 587.
52. See DICEY AND MORRIS, supra note 49, at 298-9.
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carries out preliminary work in relation to granting or obtaining
loans. It seeks to give publicity to the foreign bank and encourage
trade between Korea and the United Kingdom, and it consults with
other banks or financial institutions on the usual operating matters. It
has therefore established a place of business within Great Britain and
it matters not that it does not conclude within the Jurisdiction any
banking transactions or have banking dealings with the general public
as opposed to other banks or financial institutions.
53
Much like U.S. "doing business" jurisdiction and the Japanese
court's holding in Goto, the English court treated the foreign bank like a
domestic corporation because of its regular activities in the forum. It
was apparently unimportant that the activities of the branch office in
London were "incidental" and did not comprise a "substantial part of the
business" of the company.54 Rather, the court concluded that the
activities conducted by the bank were sufficient to determine that they
had established a presence there.55
The Goto and South India Shipping Co. cases demonstrate
approaches to general jurisdiction similar to the U.S. doctrine of "doing
business" and illustrate quite clearly that the United States is not alone in
its adoption of a "doing business" type of jurisdiction. More
importantly, they bolster the notion that it is not patently unreasonable to
require a defendant who carries on substantial activity in the forum state
to litigate there-even when the cause of action arises in another forum.
III. The Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention
The Warsaw Convention 56 emerged as the first international treaty
establishing the principles of liability related to international travel by
air. It was drafted at international conferences in Paris and Warsaw, in
1925 and 1929 respectively, and was opened for signature on October
12, 1929."7 The United States joined the treaty in 1934.58 At the time of
53. See S. India Shipping, [1985] 1 W.L.R. at 592.
54. Id. at 591.
55. Id. at 587. The specific issue of the case, on appeal, centered on whether service
of process was properly effected under section 412 of the Companies Act of 1948 when
served at an office, or establishment, of an overseas company where activities incidental
to its main business are conducted. The defendants urged that the plaintiffs failed to
show that their office in London constituted a "place of business" within the meaning of
section 406 of the Companies Act of 1948. It was their contention that a place of
business within section 406 was "a place where dealings with the public (as opposed to
other banks, financial institutions and businesses) were conducted" as well as a "place at
which business constituting part of the ordinary business of the company in questions
was being conducted." Id.
56. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2.
57. See Flener, supra note 4, at 296-97.
58. Id. See also Spanner v. United Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir.
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its adoption, international carriage by air was "still relatively new, and
negotiators feared that liability for catastrophic accidents could hinder
the industry's development. ' 59 This concern was reflected in the primary
goals of the treaty, which included unifying the rules concerning liability
of carriers transporting passengers, baggage and cargo and providing for
limitations on the liability of carriers.6°
As evidenced by its provision on jurisdiction, the drafters of the
Warsaw Convention also recognized the importance of establishing
means by which passengers could seek damages in the event of
accidents. Article 28 delineated the jurisdictional boundaries within
which liability claims could be brought against carriers. Under Article
28, "[A]n action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either
before the Court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract
has been made, or before the Court at the place of destination."
61
The first provision of Article 28 permitted an action to be brought
under the Convention in a court of a High Contracting Party. A court not
situated in the state of a High Contracting Party could still "entertain
suit[,] but any judgment need not be enforced by courts in other countries
on the grounds that the original forum had no jurisdiction to decide the
case."
62
The second part of Article 28 provided the plaintiff with the choice
of four fora. The first forum mentioned is "before the Court of the
domicile of the carrier., 63  While French and English courts may
interpret this language to mean the location of the corporation's
headquarters, the place where a carrier is managed and controlled by its
officers and directors, U.S. courts understand "domicile" as the carrier's
place of incorporation.64 Likewise, the "principal place of business"
language, the second forum listed, may vary slightly in its interpretation
1999).
59. Id. at 297. The Montreal Convention reacted to the concerns of the fledgling
airline industry by its very language. It was a document intended to protect carriers more
than consumers.
60. Id. See also Onyeanusi v. PAN AM, 952 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1992).
61. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at art. 28.
62. LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL
HANDBOOK 141 (1992).
63. See Flener, supra note 4, at 296-97, for the different translations of the treaty. In
the original French text, the drafters used "domicile," which was translated into the
cognate "domicile" in the American version, but "where the carrier is ordinarily present"
is in the British version.
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways Ltd. 452 F.2d 798 (2d. Cir. 1971).
It is interesting to note that, in this context, a corporation is not considered to be
"domiciled" in a state where it does continuous and substantial business.
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from country to country. 65 The third forum requires consideration of
both what constitutes a "place of business" and whether or not the
contract has to be formed at this location.66 The final option for the
plaintiff, the "court at the place of destination," comports with the
definition of "destination" under Article 1(3), 67 thereby granting
jurisdiction to the court of the final destination if a passenger's trip
includes several legs or layovers.68
Article 28's broad scope illustrates the extent to which the Warsaw
Convention was a treaty ahead of its time. Although it was enacted in
1929, primarily to insulate carriers from liability and safeguard the
fledgling international aviation industry as a whole, the Warsaw
Convention was able to provide passengers with multiple convenient fora
in which to seek recovery of damages.69 And though its wide acceptance
and long endurance speak to the treaty's overwhelming success, the
Warsaw Convention's most impressive aspect may lie in the relevance its
provisions for jurisdiction retain today.
Yet, in spite of its myriad strengths and accomplishments, the
Warsaw Convention was not without its shortcomings. Its overall
relevance waned in light of the exponential growth of international air
travel since the treaty's inception almost seventy-five years ago. "The
Warsaw [Convention] has been altered through no less than six official
amendments, protocols, one supplementary treaty and numerous
unofficial modifications."7 °  These amendments focused largely on
65. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 62, at 145. England and the United States would
both likely find this to be the home office of the carrier. In France, however, it may be
one of two places-where the carrier is statutorily "domiciled" or where it has its "siege
social."
66. See id. for a discussion on the various ways in which courts have answered these
questions.
67. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(3).
68. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 62, at 147.
69. When placed against the backdrop of American jurisdictional jurisprudence, it is
interesting to note that the United States' adoption of the treaty in 1934 was more than a
decade before the U.S. Supreme Court would establish its "minimum contacts" test in
International Shoe.
70. See Protocol to amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955 (signed at The Hague) (known as
The Hague Protocol); Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the
Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a
Person other than the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961 (signed at Guadalajara) (known
as the Guadalajara Convention); Protocol to amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air, Mar. 8, 1971 (signed at
Guatemala City) (known as the Guatemala City Protocol); Additional Protocol Nos. I to
3 and Montreal Protocol No. 4 to amend the Warsaw Convention as amended by The
Hague Protocol or the Warsaw Convention as amended by both The Hague Protocol and
the Guatemala City Protocol, Sept. 25, 1975 (signed at Montreal) (known as the Montreal
Protocols).
[Vol. 23:1
"DOING BUSINESS" IN MONTREAL
attempts to modernize the document by assessing liability issues and,
especially, limits on liability damages.7 Nevertheless, these changes
failed to go far enough and left some signatories regarding the Warsaw
Convention as long "outdated and unjust., 72 In response to a growing
desire for an updated treaty that addressed the contemporary issues and
legal concerns of international travel by air, the international community
convened in 1999 to rewrite the rules.
In May of 1999, over 500 representatives from 121 different
contracting states and 11 international organizations participated in a
three-week conference that culminated in the production of the Montreal
Convention.73 The Montreal Convention effectively consolidated the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention and its six subsequent
amendments while preserving the original treaty's structure. 74  It
replaced seven different treaties, protocols, and amendments collectively
known as the so-called Warsaw System, 75 while relaxing some prior
76requirements regarding documentation, increasing the limit for
liability,77 and providing for a review of liability limits every five years.78
More important for the purposes of this paper, the Montreal Convention
added a fifth forum of jurisdiction to the four established under the
Warsaw Convention.79
Article 33(2) defines the so-called "fifth forum" as:
... the territory of a State Party in which at the time of the accident
the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence and to
or from which the carrier operates services for the carriage of
passengers by air, either on its own aircraft or on another carrier's
aircraft pursuant to a commercial agreement, and in which that carrier
conducts its business of carriage of passengers by air from premises
leased or owned by the carrier itself or by another carrier with which
it has a commercial agreement.
80
More simply, the Montreal Convention permits the assertion of
71. Mercy Awori, Montreal Convention 1999: An Overview, AST Legal
Consultancy (Jan. 19, 2000), available at http://astlaw.com/Awori/Awori.pdf.
72. Press Release, U.S. Department of Transportation, United States Ratifies 1999
Montreal Convention, Putting Treaty Into Effect (Sept. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dotl 0303.html.
73. See Awori, supra note 71.
74. See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at art. 55.
75. Id.
76. Id. at art. 3-11.
77. Id. at art. 2 1.
78. Id. at art. 24.
79. Id. at art. 33(2).
80. Id. at art. 33(3)(a). The term "commercial agreement," as defined by the
convention, means "an agreement, other than an agency agreement, between carriers and
relating to the provisions of their joint services for carriage of passengers by air."
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jurisdiction in a passenger's "principal and permanent" residence as long
as the "carrier operates service for the carriage of passengers by air"
within that state.8 ' One commentator has noted that while the European
Union focused its energies on securing the most strategic unlimited
liability provision at the convention, the United States, supported by
Latin America, directed its efforts toward building a consensus on the
widest possible fifth jurisdiction.82 What emerged from the negotiations
in Montreal is a treaty that appears to tip the scales from largely
insulating carriers to focusing more on protecting passengers. In other
words, the Montreal Convention reveals itself as a passenger-oriented
convention that recognizes the importance of ensuring the protection and
interest of consumers as well as carriers.
The Montreal Convention, which superceded the Warsaw
Convention of 1929, took effect on November 4, 2003. Article 55(1)
"establishes the supremacy of this Convention, as between States
commonly party to this Convention, over the Warsaw Convention, The
Hague Protocol, the Guadalajara Convention, the Guatemala City
Protocol, and Montreal Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4."' 3 Articles 53(1)
and 53(6) of the Convention set forth the provisions regarding signature,
ratification, and entry into force of the Convention. The United States'
ratification of the Montreal Convention on September 5, 2003 brought
the number of ratifying countries to thirty, the minimum number required
to bring the Convention into force. 84 Its entry into force reflects an
international desire to align the principles and provisions established in
the Warsaw Convention with a global political economy increasingly
dependent on international travel by air.
IV. Comparing "Doing Business" Jurisdiction and the Montreal
Convention's "Fifth Forum"
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to prescribe an explicit test for
the assertion of general jurisdiction, the Court has, nevertheless,
established a settled and widely accepted two-pronged analysis for
jurisdiction focused on (1) whether a defendant has purposefully availed
itself to suit through contacts with the forum state and (2) whether a
court's authority to adjudicate comports with the "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. 85
81. Id. at art. 33(3)(b). "Principal and permanent residence" is determined to be the
"one fixed and permanent abode of the passenger at the time of the accident." The
passenger's nationality does not determine her principal and permanent residence.
82. See Awori, supra note 71, at 19.
83. See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at art. 55(1).
84. See Department of Transportation Press Release, supra note 72.
85. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
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The first prong requires courts to assess the quality, nature and
extent of the defendant's contacts in the forum, whether these contacts
and activities closely relate to the cause of action,86 and the extent to
which it was foreseeable that the defendant's activities would have an
effect in the forum.87 Together these factors comprise the basis for a
court's determination of a defendant's purposeful availment. The second
prong requires an assessment of the reasonableness and fairness of
asserting jurisdiction.88 Here the court must weigh the contacts revealed
in the first prong against the following factors: the defendant's burden,
the forum state's interest, the plaintiffs interest in convenient and
effective relief, the judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of the
controversy, and the state's shared interest in furthering fundamental
social policies.
89
Despite the substantial guidance this litany of considerations offers,
uncertainty nevertheless arises in distinguishing between what is
sufficient for specific jurisdiction and what will satisfy for general
jurisdiction. The Court in Perkins embraced the "systematic and
continuous" language drafted in International Shoe for cases when the
cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's
activities in the forum State.90 That was the case in Helicopteros, and
once again the Court invoked the language from International Shoe,
implying by virtue of its holding that general jurisdiction requires a
higher threshold without elaborating on where that threshold lies. The
Court did not find the defendant's contacts to be sufficient for general
jurisdiction in Helicopteros, and thus the court did not address the
reasonableness factors in the second prong of its two-pronged due
process analysis. This left unclear whether the assertion of general
"doing business" jurisdiction requires both prongs of the analysis to be
satisfied in order for a court to assert general jurisdiction.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly stated that
reasonableness must be considered when asserting general jurisdiction, at
least one lower court has held analysis of this second prong to be
inherent in the test for jurisdiction, whether specific or general.91 In
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals protected a U.S. corporation from suit in another U.S.
86. See Helicopeteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15
(1984).
87. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980).
88. See, e.g., id. at 292 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17).
89. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
90. See Int'l Shoe, supra note 85.
91. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996).
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state by applying the reasonableness standard from Asahi.92 The court's
analysis might be considered dicta because regular activity by the
defendant that would satisfy general jurisdiction under Perkins arguably
mitigates the necessity of assessing fairness and reasonableness;
continuous and systematic conduct would substantially bolster the forum
state's interest and create a greater presumption that the defendant would
be minimally burdened by litigating there. Nevertheless, strong
arguments exist for the imposition of a reasonableness test when the
defendant is a foreign corporation, given that all assertions of
jurisdiction-as the Court has regularly espoused of its touchstone
restraint-must comport with the "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. 93
In turning to an examination of the Montreal Convention's "fifth
forum" jurisdiction, the absence of case law on the matter precludes
assistance from the courts on whether a similar threshold for activity
exists and consequently confines one to the language of the treaty itself.
As noted above, the acceptable fora for jurisdiction under the Warsaw
Convention were the court of the domicile of the airline carrier, the court
at its principal place of business, the court at its place of business where
the contract was made, and the court at the place of destination of the
passenger. 94  The Montreal Convention's fifth forum added to these
jurisdictional bases the plaintiffs place of permanent residence as long
as the defendant "carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers
by air" to or from that State.9 5
First and foremost, the language of the provision establishing a
"fifth forum" under the Montreal Convention does not require that the
cause of action relate specifically to the defendant's activities in the
plaintiff's forum state. For example, if a New York resident, while
vacationing in the United Kingdom, books roundtrip passage on British
Airways from London to Paris, under Article 33(2), the passenger can,
hypothetically, bring suit against the carrier in New York by virtue of
British Airways' operation of international flights to and from New
York. It is somewhat hard to imagine that a United States court would
not find general "doing business" jurisdiction in this situation. Despite
the fact that the cause of action did not arise from the defendant's
activities in the forum, as the Court found to be the case in Helicopteros,
92. Id. The court applied a standard developed in Asahi, a specific jurisdiction case,
to a general jurisdiction case. The dissenting opinion preferred to confine such a test to
cases of specific jurisdiction, noting that the Supreme Court had not instructed or
suggested the permissibility of such an application.
93. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
94. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at art. 28.
95. See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at art. 33(2).
[Vol. 23:1
"DOING BUSINESS" IN MONTREAL
the carrier's operation of international flights in and out of the country
would certainly be considered commensurate with the "continuous and
systematic" conduct principle established in Perkins. The very nature of
providing air travel relies on the regular operation of services.96 This
hypothetical scenario illustrates that Article 33(2) does not require the
cause of action to arise from the defendant's activities in the forum. It is
in this regard that the Montreal Convention's fifth-forum jurisdiction
bears a striking resemblance to general "doing business" jurisdiction and,
moreover, represents a currently permissible form of "doing business"
jurisdiction for a large segment of the international aviation industry.
There are, however, important distinctions to be drawn between
Montreal's "fifth forum" and "doing business" jurisdiction. First, the
fifth forum under Article 33(2) limits jurisdiction to the plaintiffs
habitual residence and thus, unlike general "doing business" jurisdiction,
precludes a foreign plaintiff from bringing suit in that state. Second, the
Montreal Convention places no limitation on the authority to adjudicate
by assessing the reasonableness or fairness of the defendant litigating in
the plaintiffs forum.97  It seems to be implicitly assumed that
international carriers who operate services to or from that State possess
the resources to mount a defense and, in general, to defend suit anywhere
they operate. A third potential distinction arises from the ambiguity of
the language defining the "fifth forum." The Montreal Convention
specifies that the carrier must provide service either directly or via a code
share or other similar arrangement with another carrier and that the
carrier must be conducting its business from premises leased or owned
96. Id. at art. 39. Article 39 reads, "The provisions of the Chapter apply when a
person (hereinafter referred to as "the contracting carrier") as a principal makes a contract
of carriage governed by this Convention with a passenger or consignor or with a person
acting on behalf of the passenger or consignor, and another person (hereinafter referred to
as "the actual carrier") performs, by virtue of authority from the contracting carrier, the
whole or part of the carriage, but is not with respect to such part a successive carrier
within the meaning of this Convention. Such authority shall be presumed in the absence
of proof to the contrary." Id. It is interesting to note in regard to this language that a
carrier might be liable even if does not "operate services" in a "continuous and
systematic" manner.
Even more enlightening is the respective liability for contracting and actual carriers
as described in Article 40. Article 40 reads, "If an actual carrier performs the whole or
part of carriage which, according to the contract referred to in Article 39, is governed by
this Convention, both the contracting carrier and the actual carrier shall, except as
otherwise provided in this Chapter, be subject to the rules of this Convention, the former
for the whole of the carriage contemplated in the contract, the latter solely for the carriage
which it performs.
97. This is not necessarily distinct from "doing business" jurisdiction in United
States courts, as it was mentioned earlier that the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to apply
the reasonableness and fairness prong of its due process analysis when asserting general
jurisdiction. In the context of the Montreal Convention, though, there is no such
paradigm to which the question of jurisdiction must be submitted.
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by it or by a carrier with which it has a commercial arrangement.98 It
does not, however, provide a definition of "operates services" beyond the
requirement that the carrier must provide for carriage either to or from
the state in question.99
For instance, does the carrier have to maintain a branch office in the
plaintiffs home state, or can it simply operate a ticket counter that
allows for the purchase of tickets by passengers? Perhaps the carrier
does not even need that. What if one purchases a ticket online for
Carrier A and checks in at Carrier B's ticket counter because the two
carriers have a commercial arrangement? Or what if a passenger
purchases a ticket through Carrier A, but Carrier B provides all of the
services-Carrier B's check-in counter, Carrier B's plane, pilots, flight
attendants, and ground crew? Can Carrier A be sued in the plaintiffs
home forum based simply on its commercial arrangement with Carrier
B? In that scenario, Carrier A does not, literally, provide for carriage of
the passenger; it merely provides for the purchase of a ticket for the
services of Carrier B.100 One could conjure up myriad scenarios through
different permutations of the elements that constitute what one generally
considers to comprise a carrier's operation of services. In short, the
Montreal Convention's lack of explicit language defining "operates
services" could prove problematic when plaintiffs elect to bring suit in its
fifth jurisdiction.
If and when courts are forced to interpret the "fifth forum"
established by the Montreal Convention, they may likely look to the
Goto and South India Shipping Co. cases as well as the United States'
approach to "doing business" jurisdiction set forth in Perkins and
Helicopteros. The language the courts use in each of these cases bears a
striking resemblance to that found in Article 33(2) of the Montreal
98. See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at art. 33(3)(a). That article defines
"commercial agreement" as an "agreement, other than an agency agreement, made
between carriers and relating to the provision of their joint services for carriage of
passengers by air." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at art. 39-41. See also GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 62, at 158-170 for the
respective liabilities of contracting carriers and actual carriers under the Warsaw
Convention. The Montreal Conventions simplifies liability under these situations
considerably. In the second hypothetical outlined above, where one purchases a contract
through Carrier A but Carrier B provides all of the services, it appears that both Carrier A
and Carrier B will be liable under Art. 40 and Art. 41. Article 40 suggests that the carrier
with whom the passenger contracts for passage by air can be held liable for the "whole of
the carriage contemplated in the contract." Id. The actual carrier in the hypothetical
would only be liable for that part of the carriage that it performs. In other words, under
the language of Article 41(1), "the acts and omissions of the actual carrier and of its
servants and agents acting within the scope of their employment shall, in relation to the
carriage performed by the actual carrier, be deemed to be also those of the contracting
carrier." Id.
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Convention. In light of this similarity, the "fifth forum" begs the
question to what extent the ratification of the Montreal Convention might
be understood to represent an adoption of "doing business" jurisdiction
on a global basis-albeit an industry specific one. At the very least, the
number of signatories to the 1999 treaty suggests a gradual, but
nevertheless growing, acceptance of general "doing business"
jurisdiction, one that considerably undercuts the arguments for its
exclusion from future multilateral treaties.
V. The Implications of the Montreal Convention's "Fifth Forum"
Jurisdiction
At this point, the implications of the Montreal Convention remain
the work of soothsayers. 10 1 If the "doing business" principles embodied
in the "fifth forum" provision remain confined to the scope of the treaty,
it will likely have little to no effect beyond the airline industry. On the
other hand, if one recognizes the adoption of the "fifth forum" as
reflecting a global trend toward the acceptance of "doing business
jurisdiction," the Montreal Convention may impact the international
understanding of jurisdiction in significant ways. In light of the
Montreal Convention's recent entry into force, it seems appropriate to
explore its potential to influence a unified global approach to
jurisdiction.
The ramifications of "fifth forum" jurisdiction may be negligible if
the language carries no weight beyond the document itself and the
industry it serves. As a treaty limited to the rules governing a carrier's
conduct and liability, its jurisdictional principles apply strictly to airline
carriers providing international transportation by air. Although it must
be conceded that the adoption of the "fifth forum" in the Montreal
Convention by nearly seventy-five Contracting States may imply nothing
about extending the "fifth forum" jurisdictional principle beyond the
aviation industry, its inclusion in the treaty and the treaty's widespread
ratification reflect agreement among the contracting parties that this
extension of jurisdiction makes sense for airline liability specifically.
Why should it be limited to the airline industry? Is there something
unique to providing international carriage by air that should preclude
offering plaintiffs the same forum for jurisdiction in other cases where
defendants are conducting business in the state? Or, more pointedly, if
"doing business" jurisdiction makes sense under the Montreal
101. The obvious exception to that statement is the plaintiff who asserts "fifth forum"
jurisdiction after sustaining injuries during an international flight between two
contracting states. In that case, the implication is self-evident; the plaintiff may file suit
in his own state provided the carrier operates international services from that forum.
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Convention, why does it not make sense generally? One could argue that
"doing business" makes sense under the Montreal Convention's fifth
jurisdiction, because the defendant's activities in the forum bear a close
relationship to the defendant's activities that give rise to the claim-
namely the operation of international flights in and out of the state.
112
This argument, however, seems to hide behind the industry-specific
nature of the treaty and overlooks the more important fact that, under the
Montreal Convention, the defendant's actual activities in the plaintiff's
forum do not need to have any connection to those activities that give
rise to the suit.
Moreover, such an argument misses the point of "doing business"
jurisdiction altogether. It overlooks the purposeful availment rationale of
"doing business" jurisdiction and the fact that a corporation that conducts
business in the forum state is provided the protection of the laws and
regulations in that state, regardless of whether the activities are of the
same nature as the primary operations of the defendant corporation. In
short, it hardly seems unreasonable to permit a plaintiff to seek redress
for injuries sustained by a defendant's activities when the defendant
conducts substantial business in the state of the plaintiffs habitual
residence. Furthermore, the adoption of the "fifth forum" in the
Montreal Convention underscores this assertion by not requiring the
operation of services in the plaintiffs forum to have any relation to the
purchase of the ticket or the activities of the defendant that directly gave
rise to the cause of action.
10 3
A long-standing debate over the appropriateness of "doing
business" jurisdiction lies at the heart of the breakdown in negotiations at
The Hague Conference on Private International Law and its attempts to
draft a worldwide treaty on jurisdiction.10 4 Article 18 of the Preliminary
Draft Convention identifies as a prohibited base of jurisdiction the
"carrying on of commercial or other activities by the defendant in that
State, except where the dispute is directly related to those activities."
105
This has been a great source of contention for the United States
102. See L.J. Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project be Saved?: A Perspective
from the United States, A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM
THE HAGUE 158, 177 n.103 (John J. Barcelo III et al. eds., 2002). Others have suggested
to the author that cases like Goto and those arising under the Warsaw Convention are
"one-sided" in the sense that the "defendants engage in the same business in the
plaintiffs home state as they do in ... the place where the event (sic) occurred." Id.
103. See Montreal Convention, supra note 80, and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Ronald Brand, Current Problems, Common Ground, and First
Principles: Restructuring the Preliminary Draft Convention, in A GLOBAL LAW OF
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 101 (John J. Barcelo III et al.
eds., 2002).
105. See Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 5, at art. 18(2)(e).
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delegation and, understandably, made the U.S. reluctant to express
approval for a convention with such language. Becoming a party to a
treaty that proscribes general "doing business" jurisdiction abridges
jurisdictional precepts the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled as constitutional
under the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution. 10 6 In essence, the
U.S. delegates' hands are more or less tied unless a compromise can be
reached.
The language of Article 18 in the Preliminary Draft Convention
requires that a plaintiffs cause of action be "directly related" to the
defendant's activities in the forum in which a suit is filed in order to
assert jurisdiction. Under the Montreal Convention, however, there is no
such requirement. Article 33(2) allows for jurisdiction in the plaintiff's
state of permanent residence so long as the carrier operates flights to or
from there. It does not specify that a direct link must exist between the
carrier's activities in the plaintiff's home state and the activities that
caused the plaintiffs harm. In fact, under the Montreal Convention the
defendant carrier could be forced to litigate against a claim for which the
activities that caused the harm have nothing to do with its business
activities or operations in the forum where the suit is filed.
It is this distinction that aligns the Montreal Convention's "fifth
forum" jurisdiction with that of general "doing business" jurisdiction.
And it is this small, albeit significant, linguistic disparity that makes the
argument against the inclusion of "doing business" jurisdiction in the
Preliminary Draft Convention somewhat puzzling and ironic. Several
modifications to the language of Article 18 regarding general "doing
business" jurisdiction have been proposed and each one seems to
generally follow the "fifth forum" provision of the Montreal Convention.
This suggests that substantial presence by the defendant through
continuous activity in the forum state, coupled with the plaintiffs
habitual residence there, should support the assertion of general
jurisdiction.10 7
106. Several scholars have remarked that in order for the United States to sign a treaty
prohibiting "doing business" general jurisdiction it would have to abandon nearly fifty
years of jurisdictional due process jurisprudence. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 41 at
406. Though such a course of action seems highly unlikely to me, Juenger expresses
doubt that given the "Justices' increasing deference to Congress and the Executive" and
the Court's "ever [greater awareness] of the deficiencies of its own jurisprudence" the
Court would declare such a treaty unconstitutional. Of course such a suggestion flies in
the face of the fact that the string of cases developing due process jurisdiction are, in fact,
constitutional precedents and relies on the fact that "learned law" is not always "hard
law." See Juenger, supra note 14 at 22-23.
107. See Silberman, supra note 102, at 177. Professor Silberman suggests that
jurisdiction could be prohibited where the commercial activity of the defendant does not
induce the cause of action, "except where the defendant has a branch office or where the
defendant's activity in the forum is evidence of a substantial presence there, and the
2004]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
In the end, the Montreal Convention offers hope that the roadblock
thwarting negotiations at The Hague can be overcome. The ratification
of the Montreal Convention, with its "fifth forum" of jurisdiction,
reflects both a global recognition of and an international consensus on
the matter of "doing business" jurisdiction-at least in regard to the
international carriage of passengers by air. Yet what is troubling about
that is the concurrent adoption of "doing business" jurisdiction in the
Montreal Convention and strong objections to it at The Hague
Conference on Private International Law. In this sense, the adoption of
the Montreal Convention creates an irony, if not inconsistency, in this
continued aversion to "doing business" jurisdiction. At the very least,
though, the Montreal Convention's "fifth forum" bolsters the argument
for including general "doing business" jurisdiction as a permissible and
discretionary form of jurisdiction in future multilateral conventions,
whereby jurisdiction would be permitted in the state of a contracting
party but would not be required to be recognized in other convention
states.
plaintiff is habitually resident in the forum state." Prof. Silberman endorses an almost
identical modification in her article co-authored with Professor Lowenfeld, where they
together propose that the provision in Article 18 should read:
Jurisdiction shall not be exercised.., on the basis of... the carrying on of
commercial activity orother activities by the defendant in the forum state
except
where the claim arises out of such activities; or
where the defendant maintains a substantial presence in the forum state
and the plaintiff habitually resides in that state.
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